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I. INTRODUCTION
Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 19641 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)2 prohibit employ-
ers from making an adverse employment decision “because of” certain
improper criteria.3  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gross v. FBL Fi-
nancial Services, Inc.4 explored the plain meaning of “because of” to
determine the threshold for causation required under the ADEA. Cu-
riously, the Gross Court came to a different conclusion than the Jus-
tices who engaged in the same exploration of “because of” under Title
VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.5  The Court’s underdeveloped
plain meaning argument and failure to elevate its choice of statutory
interpretation over the obvious and compelling alternatives call into
question whether these portions of the opinion were determinative of
the holding.  The Gross Court’s skepticism of the motivating factor
standard and mixed-motive burden-shifting scheme that developed
under the Title VII analysis, though not as thoroughly explored in the
Court’s opinion, provides a more intelligible rationale for the outcome
in Gross.
In maintaining that this was an exercise in scrutinizing the lan-
guage of the statute instead of explaining the persuasive force of the
practical considerations, the Court created confusion over whether the
Price Waterhouse analysis might still apply to other statutes with “be-
cause of” or other similar causation language.  Some of the confusion
in the Court’s opinion also stems from the conflation of causation stan-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
3. Compare id. at § 623(a)(1) (noting that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s age”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(noting that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to “fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin”).
4. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
5. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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dards with burden schemes.  While it makes sense that Gross ad-
dressed both causation and burdens, given that Price Waterhouse
created the burden-shifting scheme in part to balance the plaintiff’s
lower, motivating-factor causation burden, this Note will attempt to
separate the ideas in an effort to show how the respective opinions
grappled with the proper allocation of the burden of persuasion in dis-
crimination cases, the difficult problem of dissecting the motivations
for an employment decision, and the heightened evidentiary require-
ment, if any, under a burden-shifting scheme.
After detailing the complex history of mixed-motive burden-shift-
ing in discrimination cases that led to this particular brand of ambigu-
ity over congressional intent and sampling the variety produced when
lower courts have applied Gross to other statutes, this Note will make
the case that the majority’s decision was driven by an understanding
of the practical difficulties that mixed-motive burden-shifting has cre-
ated, a skepticism about how well the doctrine accomplishes justice,
and a legal conservatism that favors traditional causation and burden
schemes.  Further, the Note will argue that Gross is not, as the Court’s
reasoning would suggest, about the level of causation burden that
must be satisfied but rather about who bears that burden.  Though
Congress has codified the mixed-motive burden-shifting scheme in the
language of Title VII through post-Price Waterhouse amendments,6
Gross reverts to the allocation that speaks to simplicity and judicial
restraint by applying the traditional default causation standard: that
the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence.7  Finally, the Note will make the case that while Gross ap-
pears to cast doubt on all Title VII burden-shifting precedents, the
Court’s attention to practical applications and inclination toward
traditional burden structures might be compatible with the shifting
burden of production under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 which
provides a sufficient guard against the inequities of asymmetric infor-
mation, maintains the least restrictive burden on employers, provides
for the most intuitive jury instructions, and maintains the traditional
burden of persuasion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Motivating Factor and the Direct Evidence
Requirement
1. Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The law of discrimination and retaliatory discharge is highly inter-
twined and highly complex.  During oral arguments in Gross, Carter
6. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356–57.
7. Id. at 2351.
8. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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G. Phillips admitted, “[I]n 25 years of advocacy before this Court I
have not seen one area of the law that seems to me as difficult to sort
out as this particular one is.”9  Sometimes it is difficult to parse dis-
tinctions made between discharge claims for age discrimination, gen-
der discrimination, discrimination based on disability, or exercise of
First Amendment rights, but it is important to understand that these
claims are based on related, but different, sources of law.
Title VII of the CRA of 1964 made it unlawful for an employer “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”10  The ADEA is a
separate statute,  passed in 1967, that makes it unlawful “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”11
The similarity in language has led the courts to consistently apply Ti-
tle VII precedents to the ADEA.12  The strength of this practice is evi-
denced by the fact that courts often feel it necessary to justify any
divergence from it.  For example, when the Court decided the ADEA
was intended to prohibit discrimination only against older and not
younger workers, the Court distinguished the Title VII precedent that
found protection for both male and female workers.13  Notably, Justice
Thomas dissented in that opinion based on the Title VII precedent.14
2.  McDonnell Douglas v. Green
Percy Green, a black man, lost his job with McDonnell Douglas
during a period of cost-cutting by company management.15  After his
discharge, he was involved in at least one protest of the company’s
hiring policies in which protestors blocked traffic in and out of a Mc-
Donnell Douglas plant during the morning shift change.16  When the
company started to add positions, it refused to rehire Green because of
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (No. 08-441),
2009 WL 832958 at *29.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
12. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)
(“[I]nterpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies with equal
force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the
ADEA ‘were derived in haec verba from Title VII.’” (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 584 (1978))).
13. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 597–98 (2004).
14. Id. at 608–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  This is notable because Justice Thomas
also authored Gross, an ADEA case, which fails to mention Title VII precedent
that is directly on point.
15. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).
16. Id. at 794–95.
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his involvement in the protest.17  Green filed a complaint under Title
VII claiming the decision not to rehire him was because of his race.18
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court established a pre-trial scheme in
which the burden of production shifts in order to frame and clarify the
issues for trial.  First, the employee must show:
(i) [T]hat he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant’s qualifications.19
Second, the defendant must articulate some legitimate reason for the
employment action.20  Finally, the employee must be given the oppor-
tunity to prove that the employer’s professed reason is mere pretext
and that the actual reason was discrimination.21
This pre-trial burden-shift achieves three primary advantages
without shifting the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff at trial.
First, simple cases involving obvious, legitimate reasons for the em-
ployment decision or where the defendant fails to articulate legitimate
reasons can be dispensed with before trial.  Also, there is no risk of
confusing the jury with a complicated instruction because the burden-
shifting ends before the trial begins.  Most importantly, the plaintiff,
armed with the information disclosed before trial, can attempt to meet
its burden by attacking the defendant’s professed reason as pretext in
an effort to show that discrimination was the more likely motivation.
The Supreme Court later clarified that McDonnell Douglas is only
to be applied in cases where the plaintiff fails to provide direct evi-
dence of discrimination.22  In cases where the plaintiff does prove dis-
crimination by direct evidence, courts before McDonnell Douglas were
already shifting the burden to the defendant to show that the same
decision would have been made absent discrimination.23  The addi-
tional protection provided by McDonnell Douglas was to arm the
plaintiff who lacked direct evidence with the defendant’s professed le-
gitimate reasons before trial so that, in addition to trying to prove dis-
crimination by circumstantial evidence, the employee could rebut
alternative legitimate reasons given by his employer.
17. Id. at 796.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 802.
20. Id. at 802–03.
21. Id. at 804.
22. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Fields v.
Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987), abrogated by Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
23. See, e.g., Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
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3. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
In 1982, Ann Hopkins was considered for partnership at Price
Waterhouse but was ultimately rejected.24  Unlike pretext cases
under McDonnell Douglas, in which the defendant puts forth a legiti-
mate reason for the dismissal and the plaintiff attacks the credibility
of that reason as pretext for discrimination, the evidence was clear
that Price Waterhouse considered gender in its decision to reject Hop-
kins: the plaintiff had direct evidence.25
Less clear, was whether the discrimination actually caused Hop-
kins’ partnership bid to be rejected.  While much of the Court’s analy-
sis focused on how to read Title VII’s causation language (“because
of”), the Court clearly had a broader agenda in hearing the case: “We
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals
concerning the respective burdens of proof of a defendant and plaintiff
in a suit under Title VII when it has been shown that an employment
decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate mo-
tives.”26  The Court was ultimately concerned with striking the “bal-
ance between employee rights and employer prerogatives.”27
Title VII of the CRA of 1964 made it unlawful for an employer “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”28  The Court’s in-
quiry was framed largely as whether Price Waterhouse’s decision to
fire Hopkins was made because of gender, as required under the
statute.29
At first glance, “but for” causation seems sufficient to answer this
question: if removing the improper motive from the process would
have changed the employer’s decision, it was a cause of the employ-
ment decision, even if it had a relatively small, incremental effect.30
The plaintiff would offer evidence that discrimination, while not the
only factor, was a determinative factor in the employment decision,
the defendant would rebut that evidence by offering evidence showing
that other legitimate reasons wholly accounted for the firing, and the
finder of fact would determine whether the causation element was sat-
isfied.  This process is consistent with the Court’s interpretation of the
statute.  The Court read Title VII’s use of “because of” “to mean that
gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions” and explicitly re-
24. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–32.
25. Id. at 258.
26. Id. at 232.
27. Id. at 239.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
29. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239–40.
30. See id. at 240.
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jected the construction of “because of” as meaning “solely because
of.”31  This reading contemplates that even partial reasons can be
causal factors.
However, the Court based its holding on a more complex under-
standing of mixed motives.  The Court describes the problem in a clas-
sic Anderson v. Minneapolis-type32 concurrent cause example:
Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and suppose that
either force acting alone would have moved the object.  [Under strict “but for”
causation], neither physical force was a “cause” of the motion unless we can
show that but for one or both of them, the object would not have moved . . . .
[E]vents that are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have any
“cause” at all.  This cannot be so.33
The Court found in the statute not simply an intent to prevent the
harms associated with discrimination but rather an “intent to forbid
employers to take gender into account in making employment deci-
sions.”34  To the bafflement of the dissent, the majority argued that
use of the present tense suggested that Congress intended to look at
the events as they happened, in contrast to traditional “but for” analy-
sis which looks back in an attempt to determine what might have hap-
pened if the improper motive were removed.35
While seemingly innocuous, this move underpinned the burden-
shifting for which the decision is so well-known.  In place of “but for”
causation, the Court places on the plaintiff only the burden of showing
that the improper reason “was a factor in the employment decision at
the moment it was made.”36  Confusingly, the “but for” requirement is
restored “later, in the context of litigation,” when the defendant is al-
lowed to present as a defense that the employment decision would
have occurred even if the improper reason were not included.37  Under
31. Id. at 240–41.
32. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Saint Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 49
(Minn. 1920) (“If a fire set by the engine of one railroad company unites with a
fire set by the engine of another company, there is joint and several liability, even
though either fire would have destroyed plaintiff’s property.”), overruled in part
by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (Minn. 1921); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965) (“If two forces are actively operating, one
because of the actor’s negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his
part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s
negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”).
33. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
34. Id. at 239.
35. Id. at 240–41; see also id. at 283–84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that stat-
utes are generally written in the present tense, adding no useful basis for statu-
tory interpretation).
36. Id. at 241 (majority opinion).  The dissent, understandably, charged the majority
with divesting “because of” of any causal significance. Id. at 284 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
37. Id. at 241 (majority opinion).
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the Court’s holding, the employer is completely relieved of liability if it
meets its burden.38
In summary, the Court first established that the plaintiff’s burden
is satisfied by proving only that the improper motive was relied upon
at the time of the decision rather than proving it was a determinative
factor in reaching the decision.  Then, the Court allowed the defendant
to completely relieve itself of liability by proving that the employment
decision would have happened in the absence of the improper motive.
The Court went so far as to declare its holding to have maintained the
plaintiff’s burden of proving causation and characterized the defen-
dant’s relief as an affirmative defense.39  This effectively left “but for”
causation in place, but switched the traditional burden of persuasion
regarding causation from the plaintiff to the defendant for the narrow
set of cases involving mixed motives—the Court admitted as much:
“[A] court that finds for a plaintiff under this standard has effectively
concluded that an illegitimate motive was a ‘but-for’ cause of the em-
ployment decision.”40
Aside from the unusual statutory interpretation, the rational for
this burden-shifting lies in the public policy dealing with asymmetric
information: the plaintiff in a mixed-motive employment discrimina-
tion case cannot be expected to identify the exact mix of proper and
improper causal forces in the employment decision.41  The defendant,
as the one who made the decision, is in a much better position to prove
that the improper reason was not part of their decision.42  Further, it
is fair for the defendant to bear the risk that he will not be able to
meet the burden because “ ‘[t]he employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted
out of a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. . . . [H]e
knowingly created the risk and . . . the risk was created not by inno-
cent activity but by his own wrongdoing.’”43
It should also be noted that part of the confusion in applying Price
Waterhouse to any particular case is that it was a plurality opinion
which many circuits would interpret by the most narrow holding.44  In
this case, the most narrow holding was that of Justice O’Connor’s con-
currence which, in an effort to balance the uncommon shift of the bur-
den of persuasion to the defendant, required that the plaintiff provide
“direct evidence” of discrimination.45  What exactly constitutes direct
evidence is the subject of much debate but might be informed by the
38. Id. at 244–45.
39. Id. at 246.
40. Id. at 249.
41. Id. at 238–39.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 250 (quoting NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)).
44. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2009) (citing Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276.
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pre-McDonnell Douglas cases that immediately shifted the burden to
the defendant where the plaintiff proved direct evidence of
discrimination.
Just as the holdings of other employment discrimination actions
were applied across the breadth of discrimination cases, the holding of
Price Waterhouse was seen as applicable to other discrimination stat-
utes.46  The Seventh Circuit applied the Price Waterhouse motivating
factor framework to age discrimination under the ADEA before the
1991 amendment to the CRA,47 and other circuits have continued to
apply the framework to the ADEA, even after the amendment.48
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The process of applying doctrines across discrimination statutes
was complicated by the CRA of 1991.  As noted above, the CRA of 1964
made it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin.”49  The Congressional Record associated
with the 1964 Act indicated that “[t]o discriminate is to make a dis-
tinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor.”50  Before Price
Waterhouse, the Court used language equating “because of” under the
statute to “but for” causation under a traditional burden scheme.51
The Price Waterhouse Court insisted it had maintained “but for” cau-
sation.52  As amended, the Act clearly reflects congressional approval
of, at least, the burden-shifting in Price Waterhouse, and arguably, the
46. See supra subsection II.A.1.
47. See Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 909 F.2d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), reh’g granted and opinion vacated 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991).
48. See EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2004); Rachid v.
Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004); Wexler v. White’s Fine Furni-
ture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003); Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp, 214
F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2000); Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1995); Hut-
son v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 1995); Ostrowski v. Atlan-
tic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1992).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
50. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
51. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (noting a
violation of Title VII occurs if a plaintiff “was denied an employment opportunity
on the basis of a discriminatory criterion”); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry-
dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683 (1983) (recognizing a violation of Title VII if
an employer treated an employee “in a manner which but for that person’s sex
would be different” (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 711 (1978))); Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358
(1977) (finding a violation of Title VII if the employment action was “based on”
discrimination).
52. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989).
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opinion’s interpretations of “because of” and “but for” causation.  The
CRA of 1991 included a new provision for Title VII: “Except as other-
wise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any em-
ployment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.”53  While this seems like a major change in the law, to an extent,
this language was unnecessary.  Motivating factor was already the
law of the land under the Supreme Court’s decision in Price
Waterhouse.54  However, Congress also added a provision making a
significant change to the effect of the affirmative defense created
under the mixed-motive framework.  Rather than the defendant fully
avoiding liability, the amended CRA limited the plaintiff’s remedies to
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs associ-
ated with bringing the claim.55  The new provision specifically denied
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or back pay where the
defendant meets the burden of persuasion under the affirmative
defense.56
5.  Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa
The Court granted certiorari in Desert Palace to determine
whether the language of the 1991 amendment to the  CRA supported
Price Waterhouse’s direct evidence requirement.57  Ignoring the com-
plicated plurality opinion that suggested the direct evidence require-
ment, the Court found the lack of any explicit heightened standard in
the language of the 1991 Act determinative.58  The Court explained
that Congress has been “unequivocal” in creating higher burden re-
quirements, and that the lack of an explicitly stated heightened bur-
den must lead to application of the “conventional rule of civil litigation
that generally applies in Title VII cases”59: that the plaintiff proves
his case by a preponderance of the evidence.60 Desert Palace left open,
until Gross, whether other discrimination statutes based on the ear-
lier 1964 Title VII language and unchanged by the 1991 Act would
continue to follow Price Waterhouse or would also jettison the direct
evidence requirement under the shared doctrine principal.61
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
54. See supra subsection II.A.3.
55. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
56. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
57. Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003).
58. Id. at 98–99 (“[o]n its face, the statute does not mention, much less require, that a
plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence.”).
59. Id. at 99 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989)).
60. Id. at 99 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 253).
61. See supra subsection II.A.1.
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6.  Smith v. City of Jackson
In Smith, the Court faced a similar doctrinal problem as the one
left open by Desert Palace but on a different issue. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.62 laid out a theory of recovery for disparate impact claims
under Title VII of similar significance to Price Waterhouse’s  theory of
recovery for mixed-motive claims under Title VII.63  Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co., Inc. v. Antonio64 narrowly construed the employer’s liability
under Griggs, and the CRA of 1991 abrogated the narrowing by Wards
Cove by changing the language of Title VII.65  However, it did not
change the ADEA.66
The decision before the Court in Smith was whether the CRA of
1991 abrogated Wards Cove for Title VII alone, or whether Congress
was expressing its dissatisfaction with Wards Cove in general.67  The
Court found the difference in the contemporaneous treatment of the
statutes evidenced an intent to abrogate Wards Cove’s narrowing for
Title VII but to leave Wards Cove intact for the ADEA.68
B. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. Facts and Holding
1. Facts and Procedural History
Jack Gross was fifty-four years old and had worked for FBL Finan-
cial for over thirty years when he was reassigned to a position with
less responsibility.69  Many of his former responsibilities were as-
signed to one of Gross’s former subordinates who was promoted to a
newly created position.70  Gross filed suit under the ADEA, alleging
that FBL demoted him because of his age.71  In its defense, FBL as-
serted that the reassignment was part of larger corporate restructur-
ing and that Gross’s new responsibilities were best suited to his
skills.72
The trial court instructed the jury under the mixed-motive frame-
work of Price Waterhouse: that they must find for Gross if he proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that FBL demoted him and that
his “age was a motivating factor” in the decision.73  The jury was in-
62. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
63. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005).
64. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
65. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizzaro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217 (2007) (questioning Smith’s holding).
69. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346–47 (2009).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2347.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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structed that age was a “ ‘motivating factor’ if [it] played a part or a
role in [FBL]’s decision to demote [him].”74  Finally, the trial court in-
structed the jury regarding FBL’s affirmative defense: the defense is
established “if it has been proved by the preponderance of the evidence
that [FBL] would have demoted [Gross] regardless of his age.”75  The
jury found for Gross and awarded $46,945 in lost compensation.76
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard
FBL’s appeal challenging the jury instruction.77  The Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded on the ground that the trial court did not
properly apply the holding of Price Waterhouse to the jury instruc-
tion.78  It held the instruction should have included the requirement
from Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence that the plain-
tiff show by “direct evidence” that the inappropriate criteria played a
“substantial role” (was a motivating factor) in the adverse employ-
ment decision.79  The Eighth Circuit refused to apply Desert Palace to
the ADEA.80  Though Desert Palace held the direct evidence require-
ment inapplicable to Title VII after the 1991 amendments, the deci-
sion was based on changes in the burden language of Title VII that
were not changed in the ADEA.81  The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari on the narrow question of whether direct evidence is necessary to
shift the burden in a mixed-motive ADEA case.82
2. Majority Opinion
The Court almost immediately set aside the propriety of the direct
evidence requirement to answer the “threshold question” of whether
Price Waterhouse applied to the ADEA at all.83  The Court’s holding,
supported by five justices, was that the ADEA required the plaintiff to
prove “but-for” causation, and, therefore, the Price Waterhouse mixed-
motive burden-shifting instructions were given in error.84  The Court
refused to apply Price Waterhouse to the ADEA.  The holding was sup-
ported by three major arguments.
The first argument was that the plain meaning of “because of” in
the ADEA requires “but for” causation and is therefore inconsistent
with both motivating factor analysis and burden shifting.85  The Court
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008).
78. Id. at 360.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 361–62.
81. Id.
82. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009).
83. Id. at 2348.
84. Id. at 2350–51.
85. Id. at 2350.
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started with dictionary definitions (“by reason of” and “on account of”),
from which it gleaned that the ordinary meaning of “because of” in the
ADEA is that “age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to
act.”86  The Court then cited its own analysis of “because of” language
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens which equated “reason” with having “a
determinative influence on the outcome.”87  From this progression of
definitions, the Court concluded the ADEA must require “but for” cau-
sation and traditional burden shifting.88  This is confusing considering
the parallel analysis in Price Waterhouse that led to the conclusion
that “because of” does not require “but for” causation or, at least, does
not require the plaintiff to prove it.89  The Court never directly ad-
dressed this conflict.  The analysis is also confusing because mixed-
motive burden-shifting is not necessarily inconsistent with requiring
the employment decision to have “a determinative influence on the
outcome.”90  In fact, the majority in Price Waterhouse insisted it had
maintained “but-for” causation.91
The Court’s strongest argument invoked one of the most clear and
accessible rules of statutory interpretation: if two statutes are contem-
poraneously modified and a provision is added to one but omitted from
the other, there is a presumption that the omission was intentional.92
The addition in 1991of the “motivating factor” framework to the statu-
tory language of Title VII but not the ADEA, which was altered con-
temporaneously, led the majority to the conclusion that Congress
intended the two statutes to operate differently.93  Namely, the ADEA
was not intended to utilize mixed-motive burden-shifting.94
The more practical-minded argument put forth by the Court was
that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting is too confusing for juries and,
therefore, impedes the proper administration of justice.95  The Court
pointed to both specific cases in which lower courts have struggled
with formulating an accurate jury instruction and to the high fre-
quency of judgments notwithstanding the verdict in ADEA cases
generally.96
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
88. Id.
89. See supra subsection II.A.3 (discussing the reasoning of Price Waterhouse).
90. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
92. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
93. Id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (explaining the “super-strong presumption” against over-
ruling statutory precedents).
94. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
95. Id. at 2352.
96. Id.  One of these cases was Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir.
1992), where the court, in an age discrimination suit, undertook an extensive
analysis of the holding of Price Waterhouse, the differences between pretext and
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3. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent presented three counter-arguments.  First, the similar-
ity of the causation language in Title VII and the ADEA suggested
they should be interpreted consistently.97  Second, the history of treat-
ing Title VII decisions as weighty precedent in ADEA claims cau-
tioned against abandoning Price Waterhouse.98  Third, the 1991
amendments to the CRA affirmed the wisdom of Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting for all discrimination claims, not exclusively for Title
VII.99
C. Lower Court Treatment Since Gross: The Confusion
Many courts have had the opportunity to apply Gross to other stat-
ues.  The outcomes vary widely.  Most accept that, after Gross,  courts
must look to the language of the statute for explicit authorization
before applying elements of Price Waterhouse that, prior to Gross,
were routinely incorporated into other discrimination and retaliation
claims.  This has left some statutes “in” and some “out” depending on
whether the court reads the language as consistent with mixed-mo-
tives or requiring “but for” causation.
In Fairley v. Andrews, focusing on the Gross Court’s comparison of
ADEA language to the explicit authorization for mixed-motives in Ti-
tle VII, the Seventh Circuit read Gross as requiring the plaintiff to
prove “but for” causation unless the statute expressly directs other-
wise.100  The court found that First Amendment retaliation claims
cannot include burden-shifting because no statute specifically autho-
rizes it.101  The court reached a similar conclusion in Serwatka v.
Rockwell Automation, Inc., finding the ADA does not contain explicit
authorization for mixed-motive analysis.102
The Sixth Circuit, in Hunter v. Valley View Local School District,
focused on the Department of Labor regulation interpreting the word
“opposing” in the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).103  Since the reg-
ulation described an employer’s consideration of opposition conduct as
the use of “negative factors,” the court found the regulation contem-
plated that other legitimate factors might also have influenced the em-
mixed-motive cases, and what constitutes direct evidence of discrimination due to
Bethlehem Steel’s challenge to the jury instruction as a Price Waterhouse instruc-
tion). Id. at 1179.
97. Id. at 2353–54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 578 F.3d 518, 525–26 (7th Cir. 2009).
101. Id.
102. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010).
103. 579 F.3d 688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2009).
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ployment decision.104  The court held the language fit the statutory
authorization for mixed-motive burden-shifting required by Gross.105
Interpreting the same statute, an Illinois district court found the “op-
posing” language of the FMLA was capable of supporting the mixed-
motive instruction but did not clearly include the explicit authoriza-
tion required by Gross.106  Regardless, the court applied mixed-motive
burden-shifting to the opposition clause of the FMLA based on author-
itative Seventh Circuit precedent while anticipating the Seventh Cir-
cuit might reverse this precedent in the wake of Gross.107
In Smith v. Xerox Corp., the Fifth Circuit, without much reasoning,
refused to read Gross as requiring comparison between the discrimi-
nation and retaliation provisions of Title VII.108  Instead, the court
found the reasoning of Price Waterhouse controls across all provisions
of Title VII, despite the lack of express authorization for mixed-motive
analysis in the retaliation provision.109  The District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Mexico, in Torres v. McHugh, did distinguish across dif-
ferent provisions of the ADEA.110  It found the section of the ADEA
dealing with federal employees that used “free from” rather than “be-
cause of” left room for the use of mixed-motive claims under that
section.111
Finally, in Jones v. Oklahoma City Public Schools, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in the narrowest reading of Gross, held the opinion does not pro-
hibit mixed-motive claims under the ADEA, rather it only prevents
burden-shifting.112
III. ANALYSIS
When the Gross majority’s three major arguments are scrutinized,
two are revealed to be less than persuasive.  The contemporaneously-
amended-statutes argument is diminished by a failure to distinguish
strong alternative readings, and the Court’s determinative definition
of “because of” is not only convoluted but ignores important precedent.
What remains is the Court’s concern that mixed-motive burden-shift-
ing is difficult to implement.  While this is likely the source of the
Court’s motivations, the effects of the case on statutory discrimination
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Rasic v. City of Northlake, No. 08-C-104, 2009 WL 3150428, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
25, 2009).
107. Id.
108. 602 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2010).
109. Id.
110. 701 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1222 (D. N.M. 2010).
111. Id. at 1222.
112. 617 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2010).
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cases can only be gleaned from the maneuvering the Court makes
when defining “because of.”
A. Interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Court’s most compelling interpretive tool in Gross was draw-
ing a distinction between the changes made to contemporaneously
amended statutes.113 While this interpretive doctrine is undoubtedly
sound when Congress writes statutes, it is less clear that it applies
when Congress amends statutes with the express purpose of overrid-
ing judicial interpretation.114  At the time Congress prepared the 1991
amendments, “motivating factor” was already the law of the land.  The
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the original CRA in Price
Waterhouse established the precedent under Title VII, and lower
courts already applied it to other discrimination statutes in conform-
ance with the court’s tradition.115  The most obvious way for Congress
to overrule such an interpretation in the ADEA would be to add ex-
plicit restrictive language to the text of the ADEA itself.  By contrast,
it seems strange to think Congress would express its intention to over-
ride the motivating factor framework under the ADEA by confirming
that it should persist under Title VII.
Perhaps a more natural interpretation of Congress’s intent is
found in the context of the actual change to the law.  In creating the
mixed-motive burden-shifting scheme, Price Waterhouse provided an
employer a complete defense if it could show that it would have made
the same decision in the absence of discriminatory influences.116  Af-
ter the CRA of 1991, the mixed-motive burden-shifting framework re-
mained intact, but a defendant could no longer completely avoid
liability by showing that it would have made the same employment
decision in the absence of the improper factor.117
The context of the change might imply that Congress simply
wanted to adjust the affirmative defense by holding employers respon-
sible not only for employment decisions hinging solely on an improper
factor, but also (to a lesser degree) for decisions in which the improper
factor was relied upon but did not determine the outcome.  This would
explain why Congress would add motivating factor language to a stat-
ute that was already being implemented with motivating factor analy-
113. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
114. See Prenkert, supra note 68, at 253  (arguing that Congress’s intention to over-
rule Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 659 (1989) in the CRA of
1991 for Title VII cases should not have led to the application of Wards Cove in
the ADEA case Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), but rather should
have led to deciding Smith as a matter of first impression).
115. See supra subsection II.A.4 (discussing the application of Price Waterhouse to
other discrimination statutes).
116. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
117. Id.
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sis under Price Waterhouse.118  The motivating factor language was
only added as context to the substantive change in the law: narrowing
the effect of the affirmative defense.  Under this interpretation, Con-
gress’s clear approval of mixed-motive burden-shifting could be a con-
firmation that courts should continue its application in other similar
discrimination statutes (the confirmation interpretation).
On the other hand, Congress might have intended the two statutes
to be handled differently.  One possibility is that Congress intended
what the Court in Gross effected: Title VII claimants can shift the bur-
den of persuasion regarding causation if they can establish motivating
factor, but claimants under the ADEA must bear the burden of per-
suading the finder of fact on causation along with the other ele-
ments119 (the broad distinction interpretation).  The other possibility
is that Congress intended to provide limited damages for Title VII
claimants but intended to leave Price Waterhouse in place for other
discrimination claims (the narrow distinction interpretation).  The
narrow distinction interpretation is bolstered by the Court’s own pre-
cedent under highly similar circumstances in Smith v. City of Jackson,
where it held the CRA of 1991 abrogated Wards Cove for Title VII but
left it in place for the ADEA.120
Looking back to the reasoning in Smith, the Gross Court might
have found a distinction between the statutes based on the differing
contemporaneous treatment but left Price Waterhouse intact for the
ADEA.121 However, instead of reading the 1991 Title VII amend-
ments as aimed solely at Title VII, the Court went beyond its interpre-
tative framework in Smith and declared Price Waterhouse totally
inapplicable to the ADEA.122  Given that the same four-Justice core
made up the majority in Smith and the dissent in Gross, perhaps it
was the divergence from Smith that the Gross dissent referred to
when it accused the majority of “unnecessary lawmaking.”123  Regard-
less, the persuasive weight of the Court’s statutory interpretation ar-
gument is diminished by the Court’s failure to justify its rejection of
the confirmation interpretation and the narrow distinction interpreta-
tion in favor of the broad distinction interpretation.
118. Id.
119. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
120. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005); see also supra subsection
II.A.6 (discussing the reasoning of Smith).
121. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
122. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
123. Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The four justice core in the Smith majority
and Gross dissent were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer.
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B. Price Waterhouse as Precedent: Determining Causation
and the Burden of Persuasion by Defining
“Because Of”
The majority makes quite clear that it believes “because of” re-
quires “a determinative influence on the outcome.”124  The fact the
Court quoted a 1993 case is evidence that this is not a new idea.125  In
fact, despite the Court’s protests to the contrary, this is really consis-
tent with, if not the same as, the conclusion the Court came to in Price
Waterhouse.  As noted, the Price Waterhouse majority seemed to be
saying that “because of” means relied upon in the employment deci-
sion regardless of its causal significance,126 but it restored the show-
ing of “but for” causation in the defendant’s opportunity to avoid
liability by disproving causal significance.127  The dissent in Price
Waterhouse is informative:
One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow confusion is that it
claims Title VII liability is unrelated to but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-
for standard once it has placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the
employer. This approach conflates the question whether causation must be
shown with the question of how it is to be shown. . .  [T]he plurality’s theory of
Title VII causation is ultimately consistent with a but-for standard.128
This is a source of confusion not only in Price Waterhouse but in
Gross: the causation requirement is conflated with the placing of the
burden. Price Waterhouse retained “but for” causation but required
the defendant to bear the final burden of persuasion as to the causal
significance of the discriminatory factor.129 Gross also focused on the
“but for” requirement but read “but for” as requiring a specific burden
of persuasion as well as a specific level of causation.130  Under the
confusion of the conflation, the Court found a way to contain the
reaches of Price Waterhouse’s suspect burden-shifting to the statutes
in which Congress has specifically adopted it.131  The Court admitted
that, regarding Price Waterhouse, “it is far from clear that the Court
would have the same approach were it to consider the question today
in the first instance.”132  The Court’s opinion really amounts to, and
should be treated as, an overturning of Price Waterhouse.
124. Id. at 2350 (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
125. Id.
126. See supra subsection II.A.3.
127. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
128. Id. at 283 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 241.
130. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351.
131. Id. at 2350–51.  The effectiveness of this limitation, given the confusion it engen-
dered, is questionable. See supra section II.C; see also Martin J. Katz, Gross Dis-
unity, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 857 (2010) (framing the confusion as a problem of
disunity among similar causes of action).
132. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351-52.
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In this way, Gross is a return to conventional burden placement.
In shifting the burden of persuasion regarding causation to the defen-
dant Price Waterhouse departed from what Justice O’Connor called
“the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to
prove their claims.”133  Generally, as a matter of fairness, the burden
should only shift to the defendant for affirmative defenses or exemp-
tions.134  This is not a matter of policy but of judicial restraint.135  For
better or for worse, the Court in Price Waterhouse gave in to the temp-
tation to adjust the default rules based on an intuition that it was not
fair for a plaintiff to bear the burden “of establishing facts peculiarly
within the knowledge of his adversary.”136  The Court in Gross merely
attempted to reestablish the default where Congress has not expressly
stated otherwise.
C. Burden Shifting After Gross
While it is certainly accepted that the burden of persuasion may be
shifted under certain circumstances, it is typically reserved for cir-
cumstances of unfairness that cannot be mitigated through other
mechanisms.137  The Gross Court made clear that “because of” will not
bear an interpretation that shifts the burden of persuasion in the
ADEA and probably indicated hostility to such burden shifting in gen-
eral.138  While the (non-Title VII) discrimination claimant after Gross
is at a disadvantage trying to prove mechanisms of causation better
known and understood to the employer, there exists another mecha-
nism to safeguard the plaintiff against unequal access to information:
shifting the burden of production.
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first make an eviden-
tiary showing that suggests discrimination was the cause of the ad-
verse employment action.139  Next, the defendant must then produce
evidence that discrimination was not the true cause of the action.140
Finally, the plaintiff may then prove its case by persuading the fact
finder that discrimination was the true reason and that the employer’s
133. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005).
134. Id. at 57.
135. For an argument that Gross is judicial policy making, see Catherine Struve,
Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51
B.C. L. REV. 279 (2010).
136. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60 (quoting United States v. New York N.H. & H.R. Co., 355
U.S. 253, 256, n.5 (1957)); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 626 (1993) (stating that it is
sensible to burden the party more likely to have information relevant to the
facts).
137. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 238–39 (1989).
138. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
139. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
140. Id. at 802–03.
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professed reason is merely pretext for discrimination.141  Broadened
slightly for mixed-motive cases, this would simply require the plaintiff
make a showing that suggests discrimination was part of the reason
for the adverse employment action; the defendant would then be re-
quired to either produce evidence of the real reason for the action or
produce evidence that they would have carried out the action anyway;
and, finally, the plaintiff would have to persuade the fact finder that
discrimination was both a factor in the decision and that it was a de-
terminative factor.
This has three primary effects.  First, the employer’s burden of pro-
duction gives employees information regarding the employment action
that they need to prove their case.  Second, it protects the employer in
cases in which the evidence is equally balanced.142  This is important
because, in most jurisdictions and in most employment relationships,
the employer is not required to have a good reason, or any reason at
all, to lawfully fire the employee.143  Even in this tempered form, dis-
crimination statutes put a burden on employers to produce evidence of
lawful reasons for employment actions when they are named as de-
fendants.  Tipping the balance in their favor when the evidence is
equally weighted recognizes that the employer is not legally required
to document his reasons or have any reason at all.  Finally, it recog-
nizes that mixed-motive cases are consistent with the determinative
requirements of “but for” causation and the traditional burden of per-
suasion in which the ultimate burden for proving determinative cau-
sation is on the plaintiff.
A return to McDonnell Douglas as the primary equalizing tool also
rolls back some unnecessary complications of mixed-motive litigation.
Given the technical legal aspects of the mixed-motive jury instruction
some have wondered, “what difference does it make?”144  In other
words, the basic issue for the fact finder will remain the same regard-
less of the shift in burden.  Additionally, some have questioned
whether such fine-tuned legal standards have any effect when imple-
mented by lay jurors who are unaware of the subtle differences in the
standards.145  The Gross Court might also have considered this an ap-
141. Id. at 804.
142. Note that the burden of persuasion should really only matter when the evidence
is equally balanced under a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.  If the evi-
dence tips in one direction, that side should prevail regardless of which side has
the burden.  However, the question remains whether the burden has a psycholog-
ical effect that pushes juries to favor one side over the other in cases for which
there is complicated evidence.
143. “At will” employment is the statutory default in every state but Montana. See
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment At Will, 58
UCLA L. Rev. 1, 4 n.9 (2010).
144. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343
(2009) (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 832958 at *27 (statement by Justice Souter).
145. See id. at 23–24 (statement by Justice Souter).
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propriate change in position because, at the time of Price Waterhouse,
Title VII cases were still bench trials in which judges, versed in the
subtleties of burden-shifting, made the final decision—since the 1991
amendments, Title VII cases have generally been tried to juries.146
After Gross, juries will only be faced with the more subtle “motivating
factor” standard in certain Title VII claims.147  Because the shifting
burden of production under McDonnell Douglas takes place before
trial, juries deciding statutory discrimination cases in which Gross ap-
plies will only have to determine whether the plaintiff meets the cau-
sation burden at trial.
D. Concurrent Motivations
Though confusing, the Court’s concern in Price Waterhouse regard-
ing concurrent motivations was addressed by its holding.148  The
Court limited the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion to proving that the
improper motive was relied upon in making the decision149 but cut off
liability for defendants who proved that legitimate factors that were
also actually relied upon would have caused the same outcome.150
The problem is that the mixed-motive framework applied to shift the
burden not only to defendants that actually relied upon improper mo-
tives, but also to defendants who considered improper motives but did
not allow them to play a causal role.151  The first class of defendants
could fairly be punished under a concurrent cause theory, and there-
146. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 436–37 (2004),
available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/1.
147. At the very least, “motivating factor” will remain the standard for the primary
discrimination provision under Title VII because the amended language of that
provision explicitly incorporates motivating factor.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demon-
strates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.”).  It is uncertain whether Gross’s “but for” standard or the more generous
“motivating factor” standard will be applied to Title VII provisions that do not
explicitly adopt it. See supra section II.C. (noting the lower court treatment ap-
plying “motivating factor” across all of Title VII, though Gross might suggests a
different result).
148. See supra subsection II.A.3.
149. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
150. Id.
151. This was precisely the argument made by respondent’s attorney at oral
argument:
You go through the entirety of the trial saying to the jury . . . there is no
evidence of age discrimination, and then at the last minute, not because
you have asserted an affirmative defense — because we didn’t assert an
affirmative defense — one is foisted on us by the jury instruction that
the plaintiff asked for. . . .
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343
(2009) (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 832958 at *32.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB404.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-MAY-12 11:25
1038 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1017
fore could fairly be saddled with the risk of failing to prove determina-
tive causation.152  These defendants discriminated even if their
discrimination did not cause the employee harm.  The second class of
defendants did not discriminate in the original decision and so should
not be saddled with the burden of persuasion to basically disprove the
bald assertion of the plaintiff that they would still be employed if not
for the employer’s discrimination.  Justice O’Connor’s “direct evi-
dence” requirement mitigated this concern by requiring the plaintiff to
have some higher level of proof before the burden would shift.153
Regardless, a clear articulation of this subtle distinction eluded the
Court in Price Waterhouse, and has eluded courts who have tried to
draft comprehensible jury instructions.  Thus, the Gross Court’s prac-
tical complaints about the difficulty of applying Price Waterhouse154
speak not only to abrogating the mixed-motive standard in the ADEA
context but also in the other discrimination and retaliation regimes in
which it has been applied.  Thus, it is likely the Court will continue
the abrogation in other discrimination statutes as well.
E. The Direct Evidence Requirement
Though the Court dismissed the direct evidence requirement for
which it granted certiorari to answer the threshold question of
whether Price Waterhouse burden-shifting applies to the ADEA, its
holding does indirectly address whether direct evidence is required.155
As noted above, Desert Palace made clear that Price Waterhouse, con-
strued as including Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement,
was unique in “restrict[ing] a litigant to the presentation of direct evi-
dence absent some affirmative directive in a statute,” and, in fact, held
that no such direct evidence was required by the language of the
statute.156
Gross argued reasonably that Desert Palace was decisive in deter-
mining whether a heightened evidentiary burden was required under
the ADEA.157  The Court’s reasoning in Desert Palace seems to con-
centrate on whether the statute specifically requires a heightened
152. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–42, 258.  Defendants who allowed im-
proper motives to have an effect on their decision can only avoid liability by prov-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they would have made the same
decision even if they had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account. Id. Thus,
to the extent they can’t meet that burden, and considered both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons in making the decision, those defendants will not avoid
liability.
153. Id. at 276–79.
154. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009).
155. Id. at 2348.
156. Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100–02 (2003).
157. Brief for the Petitioner at 17, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343
(2009) (No. 08-441).
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burden,158 and the language of the ADEA has no heightened require-
ment.159  However, the Gross Court, in oral argument, seemed unwill-
ing to give weight to Desert Palace because it was a Title VII case that
turned on the fact the Title VII causation language was changed after
Price Waterhouse was decided.160  Since the ADEA causation lan-
guage remained unchanged since Price Waterhouse, the Gross Court
was unwilling to separate Price Waterhouse’s original heightened evi-
dentiary requirement from the burden-shifting scheme when it con-
sidered how mixed-motive burden-shifting might apply to the
ADEA.161
This left the Court with two options.  It could accept the height-
ened evidentiary requirement that Price Waterhouse requires, or it
could reject the application of Price Waterhouse to ADEA claims.  As
the historical practice recited in Desert Palace made clear, Congress
has manifested its intent to specify when a heightened burden is nec-
essary,162 making any attempt by the Court to impose a higher bur-
den inappropriate, if not unconstitutional.163  Instead, the Court
opted to use the differences in the contemporaneous changes to Title
VII and the ADEA to distinguish the statutes and find Price
Waterhouse inapplicable to the ADEA.164  Since Price Waterhouse in-
troduced the direct evidence requirement, rejecting Price Waterhouse
also extinguished the need for direct evidence.  Though not mentioned
in the opinion, the avoidance of the heightened evidentiary require-
ment likely influenced the Court to reject Price Waterhouse.  Given the
Court’s hostility toward decoupling the heightened evidentiary re-
quirement from the burden-shifting scheme, trial and appellate courts
should also avoid the Tenth Circuit’s approach allowing mixed-motive
claims but refusing to shift the burden of persuasion.165
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should understand the holding of Gross to limit Price
Waterhouse to Title VII claims and to revert to McDonnell Douglas for
all other discrimination claims, including claims involving “mixed mo-
158. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100–02.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1967).
160. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343
(2009) (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 832958 at *9.
161. Id. at 13.
162. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99.
163. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct.
2343 (2009) (No. 08-441) (suggesting that there might be a separation of powers
problem if the Court were to incorporate Title VII jurisprudence into the ADEA
in ways that deny the differences in the language of the statutes).
164. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
165. Jones v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2010).
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tives”.166  Beyond mixed-motives burden-shifting, the other two pri-
mary innovations of Price Waterhouse that would still be applicable to
Title VII were the complete defense for the defendant and the conten-
tious requirement for “direct evidence,” but they were overridden by
the CRA of 1991 and Desert Palace respectively.
Courts should avoid the Sixth Circuit’s extension167 of mixed-mo-
tive jurisprudence to statutes that do not mirror the “motivating fac-
tor” language of the post-1991 version of Title VII.168  The Court’s
statutory analysis in Gross suggests that it would distinguish not only
the ADEA’s “because of” causation element, but also any element that
does not specifically mention “motivating factor.”169
While it conflates the issue of the required causation with the
proper allocation of the burden of production, Gross successfully re-
turns the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff.  This reversion to the
default rule is consistent with the principle of judicial restraint that
keeps judges from making policy decisions that govern the employ-
ment relationship.  Instead, courts should look for ways to mitigate
inequities through shifts in the burden of production.  For many
claims, McDonnell Douglas is up to the dual task of equalizing the
inequity of asymmetric information while protecting the discretion of
employers to make employment decisions by imposing the minimum
burden.
166. For an argument that Gross calls even McDonnell Douglas into question, see
Michael Foreman, Gross v. FBL Financial Services–Oh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L.
REV. 681, 689 (2010).
167. Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2009).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991).
169. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
